Mind and Brain States by Hipólito, Inês
MIND AND BRAIN STATES: EMBEDDING THE MENTAL
IN THE LIVING ORGANISM
1. Consciousness on Biological Evolution
In the evolutionary process, how did the consciousness arise in a world where,
until then, it did not existed? In animals’ development, when did they first experien-
ced mental events emerging from the darkness of unconsciousness?
These mental events must be related to the neuronal events that continually were
posted in the brain, but how did they improved brain performance, making it so use-
ful for evolutionary survival? In fact, the question that needs to be addressed is the
following: what ontological status can be attributed to mental events that appeared
in a world that could be once considered as a monastic physical world, this is, the
world of matter and energy?
The instinctive performance of an animal is based on ontogenetic construction
of the nervous system and related structures via genetic instructions. From the mate-
rialistic viewpoint, learning, meanwhile, can be regarded as an increasing the synap-
tic efficiency in repeated use. We can thus consider: which advantage has been pro-
duced by experiences associated with mental actions? William James suggested that
the mind was a property acquired by a brain that is now too complex to control him-
self. It has been suggested that consciousness is useful regarding that it provided the
animal a certain holistic experience. The immense diversity of standardized neuron
activity conveyed coded information that could be used to reconstitute the image,
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With neurons emergence, life alters itself in a remarkable way. This embodied
neurons become carriers of signals, and processing devices: it begins an inexorable
progression of functional complexity, from increasingly drawn behaviors to the
mind and eventually to consciousness [Damasio, 2010]. In which moment has
awareness arisen in the history of life? The emergence of human consciousness is
associated with evolutionary developments in brain, behavior and mind, which
ultimately lead to the creation of culture, a radical novelty in natural history.
It is in this context of biological evolution of conscious brains that we raise the
question: how conscious brains connect with each other? In order to answer it,
I will explore how brain states and conscious states each participate in dynamic
interactive processes involving the whole organism. I will argue that a possible
way to overcome the hard problem of consciousness might be based on the notion
of embodiment as a process of embedding the mental in the living organism
relating dynamically with the environment through the sensory
motor experience.
In order to do so, I will provide an assembly between an anthropologic perspective
of consciousness with contemporary Philosophy of Mind, Interaction Theory
[Gallagher 2001, 2008; Zahavi 2001, 2008; Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009].
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but a holistic operation like this cannot be performed by cortex machinery;
it is, rather, achieved in conscious experience that arise when we open our
eyes and that changes itself every moment in an apparent synchrony with
visual information [see Hipólito, 2014a].
The Darwinian theory of evolution is imperfect since it does not recog-
nize the extraordinary problem that is posed by the living organisms that
acquire mental experiences of non-material type. Moreover and for another
hand, the Cartesian solution cannot be accepted, given that it argues that
humans conscious experiences are attributable to divine creation of souls,
and therefore humans are mechanical automates empty of mental activity;
as Popper [1982: 150] states “the emergence of consciousness in the animal
kingdom is perhaps as great mystery as the origin of life itself. We must ad-
mit, however, and despite its impenetrable difficulty, that it is a product of
evolution, of natural selection”.
1.1. Mind#Brain: the rising of Self#Awareness
The materialist critics argue that there are insuperable difficulties in
the case of immaterial mental events such as thinking acting over material
structures such as the neurons of the cerebral cortex. Such action is alleged
to be inconsistent with the conservation laws of physics, in particular the
first law of thermodynamics. This objection would, obviously, be suppor-
ted by the physicists of the nineteenth century and by neuroscientists and
philosophers who lie still ideologically in nineteenth-century physics, not
recognizing the evolution produced by quantum physicists of the twentieth
century. Unfortunately, it is rare for a quantum physicist, to dare meddling
in the mind-brain issue. Margenau (1984), affords a fundamental contribu-
tion «that some fields, such as the field of mechanical probability quantum,
do not transport energy or matter” which means a remarkable transformati-
on of nineteenth-century physics. Margenau continues stating:
“In very complicated physical systems as the brain, neurons and the
sense organs, whose constituents are small enough to be governed by
quantum laws of probability, the physical body is always positioned
for a number of possible modifications, each with a probability
defined; if it occurs a modification which requires more energy or less
energy than another, the intricate body provides it automatically. The
mind would not be called upon to provide energy.” (p. 96).
Shortly, what Margeneau asserts is that: “mind can be seen as a field in
the physical sense of the term. But, as a non material field, for which the
closest analogy is, perhaps, a field of probability” (p. 97). According to
Margeneau (1984), the hypothesis is that of the mind-brain intersection
being analogous to a quantum mechanics probabilistic field, which has no
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mass nor energy but that can, however, lead to effective action in
microsites. It is proposed more specifically, that the intentions involved in
mental concentration or planned thought may lead to neuronal events by a
procedure analogous to quantum mechanics probability fields. In this
context, one may question which neural events could be proper recipients
of mental events, which are analogous of quantum probability fields. The
answer can be found in recent discoveries about the nature of the synoptic
mechanism by which a nerve cell communicates with another, specially
regarding mini-sites operation. To this extent, the microsites in the brain
may have transcendental capabilities to be channels of communication
between these two distinctive entities (mind-brain). If one accepts the fact
that mental events can effectively act on brain, then the philosophical
implications are far reaching.
It is in this context of biological evolution of conscious brains that we
raise the question: how conscious brains engage with each other? In order
to answer it, we will explore how brain states and conscious states each par-
ticipate in dynamic interactive processes involving the whole organism and
therefore, that human brains learn by interaction and that this occurs at the
level of the second-person perspective [Gallagher, 2001, 2008; Zahavi
2001, 2005; Reddy 2003; Fuchs, 2005]. In the early years of social neuros-
cience, attempts had already been made to investigate two brains in interac-
tion through “hyper-scanning,” which was hailed as a break-through tech-
nology [Montague et al., 2002]. Although the application of this method
has, indeed, provided invaluable insights into the neural basis of social co-
gnition (SoCog) in conditions of health and pathology [e.g., King-Casas et
al., 2005; 2008], the approach never really caught on. At least in part this is
due to the fact that using it to its full potential would have required establis-
hing more ecologically valid ways for two or more participants to interact
[cf. Redcay et al., 2010]. However, first steps are now being taken to inves-
tigate the neural mechanisms of interaction dynamics.
Brain is an organ of modulation and transformation that mediates the
cycles of organism-environment interaction. According to Fuchs (2009),
the mind is not in the brain, but it is rather distributed among the brain, the
body and the environment, this is, the brain is not only the organ of the
mind since it is connected to a human head and body, and this body is con-
nected to its environment and to other embodied human beings.
Contemporary Philosophy of Mind is mainly based on the assumption
of a profound distinction between consciousness and biological life, in ot-
her words, the one conceived as internal and purely mental and the other as
an external, functional property of physical systems: the so called hard pro-
blem of consciousness, which cannot be solved as long as the mind and life
are conceptualized as exclusive concepts. However, according to new stu-
dies in Embodied Cognitive Science, the person must be thought not as
pure subjectivity experienced from within and not as a complex physiolo-
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gical system observed from without, but as a living being interacting with
others within the second person perspective on the “you” perspective.
2. Brain, Body and World: Learning
by Interaction
In Philosophy of Mind there is a duality between the first and third per-
son perspective, but this seems insufficient since there is a gap between a
person’s mental states and another’s perception of that person’s body
which is the only experienced from within and the other observable from
without.
To overcome the antagonism of first and third person perspective, it
has recently been proposed to introduce the notion of the second person
perspective [Gallagher, 2001, 2008; Zahavi 2001, 2005; Reddy 2003,
Fuchs, 2005].
In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of
neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are
only beginning to be studied and could – paradoxically – be seen as “dark
matter” [Schilbach et al., 2013]. The field of Neuroscience has begun to il-
luminate the complex biological bases of human social cognitive (SoCog)
abilities [Frith & Frith, 2010; Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001]. Two new neu-
roatomically distinct large-scale networks have gained center stage as the
neural substrates of social cognition (SoCog): the so-called mirror system
(MNS) and the mentalizing network (MENT). The formed is believed to gi-
ve us a “first-person grasp” of the motor goals and intentions of other indi-
viduals [Rizolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010]. The later has been seen as providing
evidence for a “Theory-Theory” account of SoCog believed to give us an
inferential, reflective and what might be called a third-person grasp of the
others’ mental states (Frith & Frith, 2006, 2010). However it remains un-
clear whether, and how, activity in the large-scale neural networks des-
cribed above is modulated by the degree to which a person does or does not
feel actively involved in an ongoing interaction.
The duality of the first and third person perspective (1PP and 3PP) is an
established opposition in philosophy of mind where it is mainly used to de-
monstrate the irreducibility of subject as against a physicality concept of
the world [Fuchs, 2012]. The experiential perspective of a subject and the
observational perspective (i.e. neuroscientist) cannot be brought to a final
congruence because even the sum of any possible knowledge about objec-
tive process occurring in the subject’s brain, body and surrounding world
would not include what it is like for the subject to have the experience in
question [Nagel, 1974]. It has recently been proposed to introduce the noti-
on of the second person or intersubjective perspective (2PP) in order to
overcome the antagonism of first and third person or subjective and objec-
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tive perspective [Gallagher, 2001, 2008; Zahavi, 2001, 2005: 206–214;
Reddy, 2003; Fuchs, 2012].
From this context results a triad of perspectives that has gained impor-
tance in contemporary Philosophy of Mind and SoCog. Each theory defi-
ning the access we use in understanding other persons:
1. Theory of Mind or Theory-Theory, claims traditionally, that other
minds are known by reference to the best suitable hypotesis on the resins
and motives for their behavior, this is, on the basis of observation, which
means from a third-person perspective. This means that interacting with
others does not add anything to this access in principle [Perner, 1991].
2. According to Simulation Theory, other minds are known by reference to
a first person perspective. This means that understanding others requires
to run an inner simulation of their behavior, thus creating an “as-if”
mental state which then has to be somehow projected onto the other
[Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Goldman, 2006].
3. The Interaction Theory is the most recent approach to Philosophy of
Mind and SoCog and it claims that it is though immediate perception of,
and embodied interaction with others that we gain our primary
experience of their feelings and intentions, without recourse to inner
theories or simulations. This approach focuses on the expressive bodily
behavior, inter-bodily resonance, intentions as visible in action and the
shared situational context in order to explain social understanding
[Gallagher, 2001, 2008; Zahavi, 2001, 2008; de Jaegher and Di Paolo,
2007; Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009].
The second-person approach has already begun to prove productive
within SoCog, pointing out the importance of experiencing and interacting
with others as our primarily ways of knowing them, preliminary evidence
from neuroimaging demonstrates profound differences in neural proces-
sing related to the reciprocity of social interaction [Schilbach et al., 2013],
which is consistent with our proposal that the second-person perspective
can make an important contribution to the neuroscientific study of social
encounters and could, in fact, lead to the development of second person
neuroscience. In respect to developing awareness of minds though se-
cond-person engagements the role of social interaction for cognitive and
social development has begun to gain center in several scientific discourses
[de Jaegher et al., 2010]: the role of interaction as a vehicle for the acquisi-
tion of knowledge has, for instance, been demonstrated in language deve-
lopment. In contrast with the Chomskian idea of a “language acquisition
device” [Chomsky, 1979], the perception of structure in social engagement
has been shown to guide vocal development and language learning [Bru-
ner, 1983; Goldstein & Schwade, 2010], both in terms of speech perception
or turn-taking.
In other areas of research interaction has been investigated by focusing
on processes such as involuntary mimicry [Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Nie-
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denthal et al., 2010], which leads to enhanced rapport and linking, but is al-
so influenced by differences in affiliate motives and independent self-con-
strual [van Baaren et al., 2003; Baaren et al., 2004]. Social interaction, ho-
wever, involves more complex forms of coordination present from early on
life [cf. Harrist & Waugh, 2002]. In this respect, Knoblish & Sebanz (2008)
distinguish between “action simulation” [Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010],
“joint attention” and “shared intentionality” [Tomasello & Carpenter,
2007]. The development of a shared perceptual and attentional space wit-
hin early mutual attentional engagements is curtail, because it paves the
way for triade interactions in which we share our mental states about a third
object or person with other [Tomasello, 1995]. Such triadic attentional en-
gagements may be crucial for developing complex joint actions [Fiebich &
Gallagher, 2012].
A second-person account does not replace first and third person ac-
counts, but bookers them to a large degree. Developing approaches for data
collection and analysis from two interacting persons (and possibly two
brains) is relevant, as is revisiting and modifying established experimental
paradigms to incorporate an emotionally engaged, interactive perspective.
How is it that largely automatic, implicit forms of interaction develop into
explicit social cognitive capacities and how does explicit mind knowledge
contribute to ongoing interactions? If one considers interaction as develop-
mentally prior to mentalizing or mirroring, then the question remains: what
drives interaction? How insights from a second-person account could be
put to use in future research using computational neuroscience techniques
and in the emerging file of social neuroendocrinology?
In this article, we argue for the conception of a second-person appro-
ach to other minds, suggesting that interpersonal understanding is primari-
ly a matter of social interaction and emotional engagement with others.
This hypothesis – well grounded in contemporary philosophical considera-
tions – provides a different route to the investigation of intersubjectivity by
emphasizing aspects of SoCog specifically related to the procedural nature
and experiential aspects of social integrations [See Hipólito, 2014b].
Conclusions
Although neurons have the capacity to send electrochemically signals,
send that signals to a set of destinations in the body and generate circuits
and systems of an enormous complexity, they are, nevertheless, body cells,
profoundly reliant on nutrients – as all cells in the body – and that are dis-
tinguishable by their ability to do things that other cells cannot do.
The traditional Cartesian and ontological division between mind and
brain is, to our knowledge, inconceivable, considering that the neurons that
compose the brain are body cells and this fact must be considered closely
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when we assess the hard problem of consciousness. As neurons emerge in
the body interior, endowed with movement possibility, life revises itself in
the way denied to plants. It begins an inexorable progression of functional
complexity, from behaviors increasingly elaborated to mind itself, and,
eventually, to consciousness.
The functional meaning of the number of neurons and their organizatio-
nal patterns is the reason by which it is not possible to assess behavior and
mind problems by excessively an isolated research on neurons or on molecu-
les that act upon them, or the genes involved in the management of its life.
Nervous systems develop themselves as life managers and healers of the bio-
logical value, at the beginning supported by innate provisions, but afterwards
by images, this is, by minds. On biological evolution, behavior based in mind
became very complex in numerous non-human species, however it is possi-
ble that flexibility and creativity that distinguish human performance could
not appear in a genetic mind. [Damasio, 2010] Mind must have been carried
and enhanced by the self-process that would come up in its core.
As the self comes to mind, life alters itself: interior and exterior mental
images are now coherently organized by the proto-self [Damasio, 2010]
and are now guided by the homeostatic demands of the body. SoCog begins
now to be flexible, this is, the presence of the core self is followed by an ex-
pansion in cognitive processing space, of conventional memory, working
memory and reasoning. Autobiographical self emerges and with this phe-
nomenon, vital regulation changes radically. The emergence of conscious-
ness is associated to evolutionary developments in the brain, behavior and
mind that end conducting to culture, a radical novelty on the natural history
route. The emergence of neurons with its consequent behavior diversifica-
tion and preparation of the tack to the mind must be a remarkable even on a
grand journey. However, the emergence of conscious brains capable of
self-awareness is the grand event that follows.
A possible way to overcome the hard problem of consciousness might
be based on the notion of embodiment as a process of embedding the men-
tal in the living organism relating dynamically with the environment
through the sensory-motor experience. Therefore, the brain must be consi-
dered primarily as an organ of the living being, and only by this becomes an
organ of the mind. In such conditions, consciousness is not an object or sta-
te that can be localized: but a process relating to something [Fuchs, 2009].
It is possible to overcome the hard problem if mind, consciousness and life
relate in co-existence from the second person perspective.
Lived embodiment on the one hand, and the physical body (including
the brain) on the other hand (Leib and Korper) are two aspects of one living
organism in relation to others – one corresponding to the first and the se-
cond person perspective, the other to the third person perspective. Having
this considerations accepted, we might be able to overcome the two radi-
cally different ontology (the mental and the physical). In order to do so, we
need to challenge the Cartesian idea that others’ mental states are hidden
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away and inaccessible and reject the notion that we ordinarily act as a spec-
tator of others’ behavior. Theory-Theory fails to grape the primary way in
which we relate to and interact with others. Learning by interaction or the
second perspective approach explains how two minds connect with each
other in a form of embodied practice that is emotion, sensory-motor, per-
ceptual and non-perceptual. Second-person interactions comprehends the
innate developing capacity to interact with others manifested at a perceptu-
al experience and, at this level, the others’ mind is not entirely hidden or
private, but is given and manifested in others’ embodied behavior.
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